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The Admissibility of Evidence Protected
by Noerr-Pennington
by Michael E. Lewyn
Although political activity is protected
from antitrust liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, evidence of such
activity is at times admissible to prove
other antitrust violations. Such evidence,
if admissible, could be used to prove
anticompetitive intent, or as a "plus fac-
tor" to prove conspiracy where the only
other evidence of conspiracy is parallel
conduct. However, the standard of ad-
missibility adopted by most courts yields
an interesting result: where Noerr-Pen-
nington evidence is most necessary to
prove a violation, it is least likely to be
admitted, and where such evidence is
admitted, it usually is superfluous.
Pennington itself estpblished that
"Noerr-Pennington evidence" is admis-
sible under some circumstances. There,
the court stated in dicta that the trial judge
may admit evidence of protected activity
"if he deemed it probative and not unduly
prejudicial." United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 n.3
(1965). The Court invoked the common
law rule that evidence that is "barred
from forming the basis for a suit, may
nevertheless be introduced if it tends rea-
sonably to show the purpose and char-
acter of the particular transactions under
scrutiny." Id.
This passage from Pennington has been
interpreted to mean that Noerr-Penning-
ton evidence shall be evaluated under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
requires exclusion of evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. United States
Football League v. National Football
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League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affid, 842 F.2d 1335,
1373-75 (2d Cir. 1988).' In practice, the
application of the balancing test excludes
Noerr-Penninglon evidence in almost any
case where it is needed to establish a
violation. Although this appears pecu-
liar, it may be consistent with the view
that because Noerr-Pennington evidence
"by its very nature chills the exercise of
First Amendment rights . . . lit] is prop-
erly viewed as presumptively prejudi-
cial." United States Football League, 634
F. Supp. at 1181.2
Absence of Other Probative Evidence
Whether Noerr-Pennington evidence is
admissible depends in part on whether
other evidence of antitrust violations ex-
ists. Where the only probative evidence
of a violation relates to protected activ-
ity, such evidence generally will be in-
admissible. For instance, where the only
probative evidence of conspiracy (other
than parallel conduct) is Noerr-Penning-
ton evidence, such evidence is inadmis-
sible. Weit v. Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
In Weit, plaintiffs argued that the trial
court erroneously excluded evidence of
defendant's lobbying activities. The court
had found that plaintiffs' evidence of
conspiracy iother than defendants' par-
allel pricing) was "so insubstantial . . .
as to preclude a verdict for plaintiffs."
Id. at 466. As conscious parallelism alone
is insufficient to support a finding of con-
spiracy, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for defendants. Id. at 461.
The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's exclusion, holding that al-
though an inference of conspiracy could
be drawn from the evidence, "it more
d!rectly suggests an agreement to influ-
ence legislators." Id. at 466. The court
held that the probative value of the evi-
dence was outweighed by its prejudicial
quality:
Given the lack of any substantial
evidence of an antitrust conspiracy
in the instant case, the threat of prej-
udice from admission of this evi-
dence is considerable. The lack of
other probative evidence of con-
spiracy would serve to focus the ju-
ry's attention on the lobbying
evidence. This could easily result in
a finding of antitrust liability for en-
gaging in the First Amendment right
to petition which Noerr-Pennington
protects.
Id. at 467. Weit stands for the proposition
that where conscious parallelism is al-
leged and ne "plus factors" exist other
than protected activity, such evidence
should be excluded as more prejudicial
than probative.
Similarly, in Bright v. Moss Anbu-
lance Services, Inc., 824 F.2d 819 (10th
Cir. 1987), plaintiff, an ambulance ser-
vice, alleged that a competitor had at-
tempted to monopolize the county
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ambulance market. Plaintiff's most cred-
ible evidence of market power was a study
showing that defendant had an eighty-
five percent market share in the county.
However, since most of defendant's
business arose from a franchise that was
granted by a city, activity related to the
franchise was protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington. Thus, the court held, dcfen-
dants' "enjoyment of the market share
"Where the only probative evidence of a violation relates
to protected activity, such evidence generally will be
inadmissible."
devolved from the protected activity can-
not support allegations of market power."
id. at 824. As plaintiff had presented no
other probative evidence of market
power, the court affirmed summary judg-
ment fof defendant.
Although it did not directly address
admissibility, Bright also stands for the
proposition that evidence of protected
activity generally is either useless or in-
admissible where no other probative evi-
dence exists.
Based on an analyis of the Weit and
Bright cases, it would appear that where
Noerr-Pennington evidence is most nec-
essary to prove an antitrust violation, its
probative value is outweighed by its prej-
udicial impact.
Where Other Evidence Exists:
Discretion to Admit
Where plaintiff has submitted significant
evidence of antitrust violations other than
activity protected by Noerr-Pennington,
the case law is split as to whether such
evidence should be admitted.
Numerous cases have admitted evi-
dence of protected activity under the
Pennington "purpose and character" rule.'
And, in contrast, other cases have held
evidence of protected activity inadmis-
sible on the basis that such evidence was
"cumulative" or "corroborative." 4
There is no clear pattern within indi-
vidual circuits. The Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits both have admitted Noerr-
Pennington evidence under the "purpose
and character" rule and, on other occa-
sions, have excluded such evidence as
cumulative. No case addressing admis-
sibility has attempted to distinguish or
discredit cases on the other side of the
issue. Furthermore, a look at some typ-
ical cases offers little guidance to prac-
titioners.
For instance, in Household Goods
Carriers Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152
(5th Cir. 1971), a manufacturer of high-
way mileage guides alleged that a com-
petitor and a movers' trade association
conspired to monopolize the market.
After defendant introduced a govern-
ment memorandum accusing the plaintiff
of misrepresentation, plaintiff responded
with evidence of lobbying by the defen-
dant. Although plaintiff already had in-
troduced an allegedly libelous letter by
one of the defendants, the court admitted
evidence of defendants' lobbying to show
"the 'purpose and character of the trans-
actions under scrutiny,' to rebut the in-
sinuations put into evidence by the
defendants, and to prove the existence
of a conspiracy ... " 452 F.2d at 157-
58. Although a libelous letter suggests
the existence of "insinuations" as surely
as does evidence of lobbying, the court
did not consider the possibility that the
latter evidence might be cumulative.
Iln contrast, in U.S. Football League,
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of
defendant's lobbying between 1961 and
1966 with respect to sports-related leg-
islation, in order to prove that such lob-
bying was "part of a long-standing
conspiracy to monopolize the market in
professional football." 634 F. Supp. at
1171. The court held that, "As evidence
of the NFL's state of mind in the 1980's,
it levidence of lobbying] is weak, since
the lobbying occurred from fifteen to
twenty years before the events at issue
in this case took place" and "to whatever
extent such conduct evidences monop-
olistic intent, it is cumulative to other
evidence that plaintiffs have cited to
Court." Id. Accordingly, the court ex-
cluded the lobbying evidence under Rule
403 because its probative value was out-
weighed by unfair prejudice to defen-
dant's First Amendment interests. The
Second Circuit wholly endorsed the dis-
trict court's reasoning on this issue. U.S.
Football League, 842 F.2d at 1374.
Cases excluding evidence of protected
activity as "cumulative" have done so
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under Rule 403. They have not explicitly
defined the term, however, nor have they
furnished practitioners with any guid-
ance beyond that provided by Rule 403
itself. Moreover, they stand in stark con-
trast to those cases (such as Household
Carriers and Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association, 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.
1977)) admitting evidence of protected
activity without any consideration of
"cumulativeness."
It appears, therefore, that a principled
distinction between cases admitting evi-
dence o' protected activity and those ex-
cluding such evidence as cumulative
cannot be found. There are, however,
several hypotheses that might explain the
differences between the two groups of
cases. For instance, evidence of pro-
tected activity arguably may be excluded
as cumulative only where plaintiff pre-
vails, or such evidence may be admitted
only to clarify an ambiguous record, or
where evidence of protected activity is
of a different type than other evidence
in the record.
Unfortunately for those in search of
an analytical framework, none of the hy-
potheses stands up to analysis based on
an examination of two roughly contem-
poraneous circuit court decisions, Alex-
ander v. National Farmers Organization,
687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 937 (1983); and City of Cleve-
land v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating,
734 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1984).
Alexander admitted evidence of pro-
tected activity, while City of Cleveland
excluded such evidence, yet the cases
seem indistinguishable factually. In City
of Cleveland, a city that had owned a
defunct utility brought suit against a pri-
vate utility for monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization. At trial,
defendant admitted that it intended to
eliminate competition. Furthermore,
defendant's conduct (which included so-
liciting participation by plaintiff in a
price-fixing conspiracy, a "displacement
program" aimed at displacing the city
utility, and delaying or refusing inter-
connection whenever possible) was cir-
cumstantial evidence of anticompetitive
intent. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at
1164.
Plaintiff attempted to introduce a joint
stipulation that defendant had induced a
third party to file suit to prevent a gov-
ernment-owned interconnection between
the utilities. The court affirmed exclu-
sion of this evidence, holding that as
other evidence of anticompetitive intent
existed, evidence of defendant's activity
"was simply cumulative in its effect."
Id.
Despite the court's finding that ample
evidence of anticompetitive intent ex-
isted, the court affirmed a jury verdict
for defendant. Thus, City of Cleveland
supports the proposition that evidence
may be excluded as "cumulative" even
where defendant prevails.
In Alexander, evidence of protected
activity was admitted despite the fact that
ample evidence of anticompetitive intent
and conduct existed. In Alexander,
plaintiff, a milk cooperative, filed suit
against competitors for, inter alia, con-
". . .when courts use terms
spiracy to monopolize. Plaintiff submit-
ted evidence that defendant, through
letters and other contacts with govern-
ment officials, had attempted to prevent
plaintiff from participating in federal
marketing orders. Alexander, 687 F.2d
at 1195. The court admitted the evidence
because it proved that defendants "acted
in concert with the specific intent of
blockirg competition." Id.
The plaintiff's other evidence was more
than adequate, however. For instance,
defendants tried to pressure plaintiff's
customers into buying all their milk from
defendants. Such conduct was termed an
"unequivocal illustration of predatory
conduct aimed at coercing buyers" to buy
from defendants and "blatantly preda-
tory." Id. at 1196. The court concluded
that the "purpose and intent" of such con-
duct was to get customers to buy only
from defendants, and that such conduct
"tends to show an unlawful intent" be-
hind similar conduct directed at plaintiff.
As to another buyer, similar conduct was
termed "plainly predatory." Id. at 1198.
The court held that defendant's price dis-
crimination and threatened supply cut-
offs were "the strongest evidence of an
unlawful purpose." Id. at 1197. Such con-
duct was "predatory on its face" and an
examination of the underlying evidence
"only confirms that an inference of un-
lawful purpose must be drawn." Id. at
1199. Other condemned conduct in-
cluded threats of litigation against cus-
tomers of plaintiff, refusals by defendant
to acknowledge customer terminations,
destruction of evidence by a defendant,
and admissions of predatory motive by
defendants' officials.
Another hypothess which might ex-
plain the divergence between cases ad-
mitting Noerr-Pennington evidence and
those refusing to do so is that the evi-
dence may be admitted only to clarify
an otherwise ambiguous record-that is,
to reveal the unlawful character of seem-
ingly innocent conduct. The facts of City
such as "cumulative" and
of Cleveland and Alexander do not sup-
port this explanation, however. In Alex-
ander, the evidence of predatory intent
and conduct was hardly unambiguous.
Nevertheless, the court admitted evi-
dence of protected activity. By contrast,
defendant won a jury verdict in City of
Cleveland.
Alternatively, it might be hypothe-
sized that the evidence of protected ac-
tivity is excluded where such evidence
is of the same type as other evidence and
admitted where it is of a different type.
For instance, if other evidence is direct,
Noerr-Pennington evidence would be
admitted if circumstantial and excluded
if direct. Again, the facts of City of
Cleveland and Alexander lend no support
to this hypothesis.
In both cases, evidence of anticom-
petitive intent (other than Noerr-Pen-
nington evidence) included direct as well
as circumstantial evidence. In City of
Cleveland, the existence of anticompet-
itive intent was admitted at trial, and
such intent could also be inferred from
defendant's acts. City of Cleveland, 734
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F.2d at 1164. Similarly, in Alexander,
predatory motive was admitted in doc-
uments, 687 F.2d at 1207, and could also
be inferred from defendants' acts. Under
the hypothesis, both courts should have
ruled similarly on admissibility. In fact,
the court in Cit' of Cleveland excluded
Noerr-Pennington evidence while in
Alexander it was admitted.
"Therefore, practitioners are well advised to take nothing
for granted in evaluating the admissibility of Noerr-
Pennington evidence."
Testing the hypotheses against the
Alexanler and City of Clevelanml deci-
sions shows that there is no logical basis
for distinguishing cases excluding Noerr-
Pennington evidence as "cumulative"
from those admitting such evidence. The
only way to reconcile the two groups of
cases is to recognize that when courts
use terms such as "cumulative" and "cor-
roborative," they are merely balancing
probativeness and prejudice.' Therefore,
the split in authority may be more ap-
parent than real.
Thus, if other significant evidence of
antitrust violations is found, the admis-
sibility of' Noerr-Pennington evidence
involves no fixed legal criteria other than
a weighing of probative value and prej-
udicial impact. Therefore, practitioners
are well advised to take nothing 'or
granted in evaluating the admissibility of
Noerr-Pennington evidence.
Conclusion
The admissibility of Noerr-Pennington
evidence will depend on the availability
of' other evidence of antitrust violations.
Where no evidence of antitrust violations
is available, or where the only evidence
is legally insufficient to prove a viola-
tion, Noerr-Pennington evidence has
been excluded. In contrast, where a great
deal of evidence of illegality exists, courts
often admit Noerr-Pennington evidence
despite the fact that it may not be needed
to prove a violation. Although admission
is disfavored, no specific rule binds
judges, who, it appears, may admit or
exclude Noerr-Pennington evidence
without any analytical framework to
guide their decisions.
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to admit
Noerr-Pennington evidence face a
"Catch-22": where evidence is truly nec-
essary to the development of a case it
will not be admitted, and where it is ad-
missible it usually will be superflu-
ous. 0
I See also Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 668 F Supp. 408, 411 (D.N.J. 1987) (balancing test adopted where plaintiff in products liability case sought to introduce
Noerr-Pennington evidence) (dictum).
2 See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 203.7 at 52 (Supp. 1987)(weighing of Noerr-Pennington evidence "should lend to its exclusion, at
least presumptively"); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts To Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits ofthe Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 45 U. CiiI.
L. REv. 80, 121 (1977) ("courts have been properly reluctant to admit evidence of conduct lawful under Noerr"). However, in Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
668 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987), the court held that the presumption was inapplicable where "the lobbying activity, though protected, is ethically questionable."
Id. at 411.
3 See, e.g., MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (admissibility briefly noted); Alexander v. National
Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983) (in addition to engaging in protected activity, defendant liable for numerous independent
violations); Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1977) (lobbying evidence held to have "evidentiary value" although liability found
based on group boycott unrelated to lobbying); Household Goods Carriers' Bur. v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971) (evidence of lobbying admitted to prove
anticompetitive intent, although allegedly libelous letter also admitted).
4 See United States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D.N.Y 1986), aft'd, 842 F.2d 1335, 1374-75 (2d Cir. 1988); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 734 F.2d 1157, 1164 (6th Cir.), aff g 538 F Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ohio 1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (as other
probative evidence available, evidence of lawsuit by defendants "simply corroborative"); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (evidence of medical society resolution supporting defendants' litigation excluded as cumulative regarding drafter's
intent, where drafter was already defendant at time of resolution).
5 Areeda suggests that evidence of protected activity also may be introduced to prove an anticompetitive "overall scheme." R AREEDA & H. HOV.NKAMI', supra note
I, at 203.7. However, other authorities do not view the "overall scheme" theory as a separate basis for admissibility. In Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 668
F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987), plaintiff sought to introduce Noerr-Pennington evidence as part of "a continuing course of deceptive conduct." Id. at 411. The court
held that "[wihether such evidence is admissible requires a balancing of its probative value against undue or unfair prejudice." Id. Thus, according to Cippolone,
the "overall scheme" theory is merely a means of ascertaining the probative value of evidence under Rule 403.
Other authorities hold that the "overall scheme" theory relates to the protected status of political activity rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., ABA A'NTITRUsT
SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 615 (2d ed. 1984); Scott v. City of Siotta City., Iowa, 1982-83 Trade Cas. tCCH) 1 65,203 at p. 71,847 (N.D. Iowa
1982) ("Where legitimate lobbying is combined with illegal actions, the Noerr-Pennington exemption has no application"). As such an "overall scheme" exists only
where other evidence of antitrust violations exists, the difference between this theory and a Rule 403 analysis is of no practical importance.
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